Energy
Georgia Lifts Azerbaijani Gas Imports 6.9% as Energy Reliance Deepens
September 22, 2026
4
Min
Georgia increased its natural gas imports from Azerbaijan by 6.9% in January-July 2026, according to the report Azerbaijan’s Foreign Trade Relations in January-July 2026 published by the State Customs Committee of Azerbaijan.
The gas figure sits alongside a sharper rise in refined products. Georgia imported fuel and lubricants worth $234.2 million from Azerbaijan in January-August 2026, 23% more than in the same period last year.
A single supplier, deepening
The combined picture is of a Georgian energy market moving further toward Azerbaijani supply rather than away from it. Gas reaches Georgia principally through the South Caucasus Pipeline and associated transit arrangements tied to the Shah Deniz development, giving Tbilisi both supply and transit revenue from the same relationship.
That concentration is a deliberate choice rather than an accident. Georgia’s alternatives are constrained: Russian supply carries political cost, Iranian gas would require infrastructure that does not exist, and liquefied natural gas would need a Black Sea import terminal that has been discussed but not built.
Azerbaijan, for its part, has been expanding its customer list across Europe. Bulgaria imported more than $200 million of Azerbaijani gas in the first seven months of 2026, and gas exports to Serbia reached $44.3 million over the same period. Iran increased electricity imports from Azerbaijan by nearly 45%.
The regional price effect
Azerbaijani refined products are also reshaping the wider regional fuel market. Armenia’s economy minister noted that without imports of gasoline and diesel from Azerbaijan, gasoline prices in Armenia could have risen more sharply, and that the existence of an alternative supply source helped prevent steeper increases.
That is a notable admission given the political history. Fuel moving from Azerbaijan into Armenia, whether directly or through Georgian intermediaries, is one of the more concrete commercial consequences of the ongoing normalisation process between Baku and Yerevan.
What it means for Tbilisi
For Georgia, rising import volumes are a mixed signal. They reflect economic expansion: real GDP grew 7.9% in the first half of 2026, and trade and real estate together account for roughly 24% of national output. Higher energy consumption is the expected consequence of that growth.
The offsetting concern is exposure. Georgia’s trade deficit remains wide, and an energy bill denominated in dollars and concentrated on one supplier leaves limited negotiating room if terms change. The country has been building domestic generation to reduce the imported share of its electricity, with roughly 300 MW of renewables and GEL 3.18 billion in energy lending recorded this year, and has revived discussion of the Khudoni, Namakhvani and Nenskra hydropower projects.
A Black Sea submarine cable, intended to let Georgia export electricity to Europe, would change the calculus further by turning the country into a net energy exporter in at least one commodity.
None of that displaces gas in the near term. Hydropower is seasonal, and gas-fired generation remains the balancing resource. On current trajectory, Azerbaijani gas and refined products will account for a larger share of Georgia’s energy mix in 2027 than in 2026, which makes the terms of that relationship a more consequential variable for Georgian macroeconomic stability than the headline percentage suggests.
Photo: Unsplash
